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History ALAMO SCOUTS

The Alamo Scouts were organized on Fergusson Island, New Guinea, on 28 November 1943 to conduct reconnaissance and raider work in the Southwest Pacific Theater under the personal command of then Lt. General Walter Krueger, Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army.

Named for his beloved association with San Antonio, Texas, and the Alamo, Krueger envisioned that the Alamo Scouts, consisting of small teams of highly trained volunteers, would operate deep behind enemy lines to provide intelligence-gathering and tactical reconnaissance in advance of Sixth U.S. Army landing operations.



History



During these two years the Alamo Scouts liberated 197 Allied prisoners in New Guinea, and provided forward reconnaissance and tactical support of the Sixth Ranger Battalion in the liberation of the Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp on Luzon, in February 1945, freeing 511 Allied prisoners. In addition, the Alamo Scouts

captured 84 Japanese prisoners of war.

Members of Rounsaville & Nellist Teams

following the successful liberation of Cabanatuan POW camp. Luzon, Pl. February

1945.

The Alamo Scouts evolved from a simple reconnaissance unit in New Guinea to a sophisticated intelligence collection group which supplied and coordinated large-scale guerrilla operations on Leyte and Luzon.



Alamo Scouts Training Center under construction Fergusson Island, New Guinea, December 1943. In July 1945, the Alamo Scouts were training to conduct preinvasion reconnalssance of Kyushu in preparation for OPERATION OLYMPIC, the first step in the proposed

Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland. Following the Japanese surrender, the Alamo

Scouts landed in Wakayama and became part of the occupation army

They were unceremoniously disbanded at Kyoto, Japan, in November 1945, never to be reconstituted.



The Alamo Scouts have the finest record of any elite unit of World War II and, arguably, one of the finest in the history of the United States military.

Back row. ASTC staff Mayo Stuntz (L) and Homer Williams (R) with natives near Kalo, Kalo, Fergusson Island, New Guinea.

In 1988, the Alamo Scouts were individually awarded the SPECIAL FORCES SHOULDER TAB for their services in World War II and included in the lineage of today's U.S. Army Special Forces.

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HE U.S. SIXTH ARMY SPECIAL RECOMM**AISSANCE UNIT OF WOR**UGATION

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Full Roster ALAMO SCOUTS


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Name / Rank / Class / ASTC Status

WATSON, Ray (Moose) / LT / AUSTRALIAN ARMY / Instructor-Junglecraft and Jungle Survival WATSON, William R. / 1LT / 2nd / GRADUATE / Assigned to Reynolds Team (Later) WHITTINGTON, Charles B. / T/4 / 2nd / GRADUATE / Returned to Original Unit WALTERS, Robert G. / PFC / 5th / GRADUATE / Assigned to Chanley Team WANGRUD, Ray W. / SGT / 3rd / GRADUATE / Assigned to Reynolds Team WATSON, Glendale / SSG / 5th / GRADUATE / Assigned to Chanley Team WEILAND, Harry D. / SSG / 3rd / GRADUATE / Assigned to Sumner Team WALSH, Edward W. / PFC / 7th / GRADUATE / Assigned to Ouzts Team WATSON, Lee F. / PFC / 9th / RETAINEE / Assigned to Williams Team WHITE, Thomas / PVT / 1st / GRADUATE / Returned to Original Unit White, Horton V. / COL / G-2, Sixth Army

Alamo Scouts Historical Foundation, Inc.

THE U.S. SUMMY SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT OF WORLD WAR II



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Final Roll Call ALAMO SCOUTS Final Roll Call

to

Oliver Roesler September 15, 2020

Terry Santos February 18, 2020

John J. Geiger, Jr March 19, 2018

William R. Watson March 24, 2017

Carl A. "Skip" Bertoch February 28, 2017 <u>Obit</u>

> Jay V. Russell May 22, 2016

Henry L. Adkins March 25, 2016 <u>Obit</u>

Harry D. Weiland August 21, 2014

Alfred L. Jacobs April 17, 2014

Robert L. Shirkey February 14, 2014

Case 3:24-cv-01282

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Filed 02/06/25





WILLIAM "BILL" R. WATSON

December 27, 1919 - March 24, 2017

WATSON, William "Bill" Robert – age 97, of Fenton joined his mother, father, sister, brother, and wife of 55 years with our heavenly father on Friday, March 24, 2017. A funeral service will be held at 1 PM on Thursday, March 30, 2017 at Brown Funeral Home – 1480 E. Hill Road, Grand Blanc, Michigan. Friends may visit with the family two hours prior the service. Burial will follow at Great Lakes National Cemetery – 4200 Belford

Road, Holly, Michigan. Bill was born on December 27, 1919 in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. Bill is survived by his children: Robert (Pat), Carol (LeRoy), Daniel (Miriam); 13 grandchildren; 19

great-grandchildren; 13 great-greatgrandchildren; and several nieces and nephews. Bill was in WWII as part of an elite group called Alamo Scouts where he earned a silver star along with several other medals, a field commission and his own team before the end of the war. Bill retired

from Pontiac Motors as a supervisor of the mechanics department after 30 years of service. In retirement, he loved golfing, traveling with his beloved Anna, and spending time with family. God has welcomed a one of a kind man, whom we will all miss dearly. In lieu of flowers, memorial contributions may be made to Heart to Heart Hospice care – 2029 S. Elms Road, Bldg B, Suite A , Swartz Creek, Michigan 48473. Please visit www.brownfh.com to leave online condolences for the family. Arrangements under the direction of Brown Funeral Home, Grand Blanc, MI.

Dignity.

Brown Funeral Home

www.brownfh.com (810) 606-1300

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
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
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CHAPTER 5

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THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO AND NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGNS

On the morning of February 25, 1944 Lt. Col. Bradshaw faced a dilemma. He sat in his thatched-roof office on Fergusson Island contemplating which team of Alamo Scouts would be the first to go on a live mission. Sixth Army Headquarters had just sent a vague message requesting that the A.S.T.C. send over a team of Alamo Scouts ready to go. But for what? Four days earlier the Sixth Army had proposed that a team of Scouts be sent on a four-day reconnaissance of the Marakum area 15 miles east of Bogadjim on the northern coast of New Guinea, but it had been cancelled. Bradshaw was confident that any one of the four teams he had available could do the job whatever it was, but since this would be the Scouts' first and most important mission, he had to select the best. He narrowed it down to the MCGOWEN TEAM and BARNES TEAM.

Lt. John R.C. McGowen, a daring 25-year-old Texan from Amarillo, had been hand-picked by Bradshaw from the 158th Infantry Regiment and was considered the wis-

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est Scout in camp. McGowen had graduated from Texas A&M in 1939 and earned his master's degree a year later. Although he was skinny by Alamo Scouts standards, he was admired for his toughness and "try-anything" attitude. Once during man-to-man combat training with Moyer, he attacked the much larger man diving at his feet and taking him down, much to the astonishment of Moyer and the rest of the camp.

McGowen's team, consisting of Tech. Sgt. Caesar J. Ramirez, Sgt. Walter A. McDonald, Sgt. John A. (Red) Roberts, and Pfc. John P. Legoud and Pvt. Paul V. Gomez, were ready to go. At twenty-nine, Legoud was the oldest member of the team. The rest were twenty-five; the perfect blend of youth and experience.

On the other hand, BARNES TEAM, led by 26-yearold Lt. William F. Barnes, was just as capable. Barnes had played on the University of Tennessee's 1938 and 1939 number two ranked football teams and was equally gifted in the classroom. He had come to the Scouts from the 32nd Division, where he had been on special assignment from the 127th Regiment to train Intelligence & Reconnaissance platoons. Barnes was a Scouts' Scout and excelled in everything he did.

Barnes' team also combined experience and youth. At twenty-three, Cpl. Aubrey L. Hall, was the next highest ranking member of the team. Then there were 32-year-old Warren J. Boes, a crack shot Pfc., and Pvts. Louis J. Belson, John O. Pitcairn, and Robert W. Teeples.

Bradshaw weighed the strengths and weaknesses of each team. A decision had to be made soon. Red Williams entered the hut and the two men discussed what should be done. Bradshaw took a coin out of his pocket and smiled at his executive officer. "If it's heads, McGowen's team goes. If it's tails, Barnes' team gets the job." Bradshaw tossed the coin into the air and caught it with his right hand. He then slapped it into the palm of his left hand.

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Lt. Col. Frederick Bradshaw outside his office on Fergusson Island, 1944. (Courtesy of Constance Bradshaw-Morrill.)

"Heads!" exclaimed Bradshaw as he revealed the coin. "It looks like McGowen's team!"

Barnes would serve as the contact officer. His job would be to help launch the team, maintain communications during the mission, and help recover the team after exfiltration. A contact team might be one officer and a couple of men, or a noncommissioned officer, but it was always a member or members of the Alamo Scouts.

Team leader William E. Nellist explained:

When a team was sent out on a mission, a contact team went out with the PT boat people ahead of time to find out where, how, and when to land. The contact team would drop the operational team off, then return to the PT base or wherever and wait for the designated pick up time. On each mission a Scout team would have alternate plans for pickup. If pickup failed the first night they had a predetermined point to open contact for three more nights

Geographical material

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at alternate points, which might be 10-15 miles down the coast. A team might then open radio contact there for three nights.

INTO THE ADMIRALTIES

The capture of the Admiralties was the final step in the isolation of Rabaul. The ring was tightening on the Japanese. By mid-February 1944, forces under MacArthur had seized major points along the northern coast of New Guinea and blocked the Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain Island, which secured access to the Bismarck Sea. Meanwhile, forces under Halsey had advanced north through the Solomons and captured Nissan Island only 125 miles from Rabaul. According to MacArthur, capture of the Admiralties would "cork the bottle" on the Japanese in the New Guinea area and open the way for the return to the Philippines.¹

The Admiralties, consisting of two main islands and several smaller islands, lie approximately 200 miles north and east of New Guinea and 260 miles west of New Ireland. The principle Allied objectives on Manus, the largest island, were Seeadler Harbor and an auxiliary landing field near Lorengau, a small settlement. Seeadler Harbor was one of the finest deep-water anchorages in the Southwest Pacific. More than six miles wide and twenty miles long, it was large enough to accommodate a large amphibious strike force. Los Negros, the second-largest island, was also strategically important. It contained Hyane Harbor and Momote airfield, with its large 5,000foot runway. Control of the harbors and airfields on the two major islands would provide bases from which to stop the Japanese from reinforcing their garrisons at Rabaul and control communication from the city north to the Caroline and Marianas Islands. It would also consolidate and defend Allied-occupied areas in New Guinea and provide a springboard for future offensives.

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The Admiralties offensive, code name "Brewer Operation," was planned for April 1, 1944. MacArthur had outlined it in May 1943, but he did not issue the final order until November 23 of that year. MacArthur assigned the operation to Krueger, who was ordered to seize the Seeadler Harbor area and to "establish airfields and light naval facilities." On February 13, 1944, Krueger received additional orders instructing him to gain control of the Bismarck Archipelago by seizing and consolidating the Admiralties and Kavieng, a strategic point on the northwest tip of New Ireland.

But on February 23, MacArthur received some early good news. Low-flying air observers reported that they had met no resistance over the islands and that they believed the Japanese had abandoned the Admiralties altogether. But Sixth Army intelligence had doubts. Their staff estimated that 4500 Japanese troops still occupied the islands. The next day MacArthur directed Krueger and Admiral Thomas Kinkaid to conduct a reconnaissance-inforce by February 29, near the Hyane Harbor area on eastern Los Negros. The force would consist of 800 men from the 1st Cavalry Division and supporting units. If they found that the area was lightly defended, the reconnaissance force would become an invasion force and move inland to capture Momote airfield. But prior to committing any troops to the islands, Krueger wanted to get a closer look. Besides, he had the perfect men for the job.²

On the afternoon of February 25, Bradshaw, arrived by PT boat at Sixth Army Headquarters, now located near Finschafen. McGowen and Barnes Teams were already there. Bradshaw entered the G-2 tent where he found a letter waiting for him. It was from Lt. Col. S.P. Smith of the G-2 section. He had the mission all lined out:

Your boys will depart here by Catalina about 2:30, morning 26 February and will land at first light in the above (southeast tip of Los Negros) area. They

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propose to work in teams of two and pass through the swampy area to northeast of their landing point, cross the river and attempt to take up points for observation in the Momote Plantation area. The Catalina will return at dusk 26 February to pick them up in case they are in difficulty; however, if the going is okay they will not be at the beach but will be picked up at dusk 27 February. McGowen is taking the party in and Barnes is going in the Catalina on all three trips. As the party lands, General Whitehead has agreed to have B-25's over the area strafing the strip and the same procedure will be followed as they are picked up.⁴

That night, Krueger called both teams into his quarters and wished them luck. He shook each man's hand and stressed the importance of their mission, not only to the operation but to the future of the Alamo Scouts. Later that night the Scouts received word that the mission had been changed. Instead of reconnoitering Momote airfield as planned, they were to now concentrate on the Hyane Harbor area. McGowen and his team worked through the night making preparations.

At 3:30 the next morning both teams nervously boarded a Catalina flying boat at Langemak Bay, north of Finschafen. After two hours in the air, the plane flew into a heavy thunderstorm. It circled over the drop off point, trying to land, but the seas were too rough and the plane was forced to return to Langemak Bay, where the men were ushered aboard the seaplane tender U.S.S. Halfmoon for some much-needed sleep. The mission was rescheduled for 3:00 a.m. the next day.

At 6:45 a.m. on February 27, the Alamo Scouts tried again, this time without the cover of darkness. Again, the plane encountered thunderstorms along the way, but the drop off area was clear enough to attempt a landing. The edgy pilot, having detected an approaching plane on his

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radar screen, didn't want to be exposed on the open water for long. The pilot guided the seaplane in one-half mile off the southeastern tip of Los Negros, barely slowing down. The touch-and-go landing made it almost impossible for the Scouts to get their rubber boat into the water. After a few choice words for the pilot, McGowen, with the help of BARNES TEAM, got his men into the boat and headed for shore. Thirty minutes later the Scouts neared a beach northwest of Chapotut Point. Gomez, who was sitting at the bow of the boat, leaped out and waded ashore, making him the first American to step foot on the island. But unknown to McGowen, the enemy had been watching. Fortunately for the Scouts, Col. Yoshio Ezaki, the Japanese Commander of the Admiralty Islands Garrison, believed that the team was reconnoitering for a landing on a nearby beach and moved one battalion away from the Hyane Harbor area to the other side of the island. This gave the Scouts time to deflate and conceal their boat and slip into the jungle.

Two hours into the mission the Scouts were startled by machine gun fire. Allied planes roared over the island and pelted enemy positions with .50 caliber fire and small bombs. Meanwhile, the Scouts sat down and waited for the raid to end. They resumed the march and soon came across tell-tale signs of the enemy. The air reports had been wrong. McGowen and his men discovered three machine gun positions and 200 yards of camouflaged trenches. They also heard screaming, which meant that someone had probably been wounded in the air raid. A few yards further into the jungle McGowen stopped cold in his tracks. He stood motionless as one-by-one he watched fifteen Japanese troops pass ten yards in front of him. Some were carrying weapons and others shovels. There was now no doubt. The enemy was definitely there and they were digging in. To make matters worse, McGowen noticed that some of the Japanese were not

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ordinary troops. They were larger than normal, in excellent shape, and were dressed in neat, well-tailored khaki uniforms. He later learned that they were elite Japanese marines.

After observing a large bivouac area southwest of the Momote airstrip for most of the afternoon, McGowen and his team arrived at a small, little-used trail thirty yards from the beach. There they set up security and remained for the night. Meanwhile, McGowen radioed Barnes who was flying overhead in a Catalina PBY. "The area is lousy with Japs!" exclaimed McGowen. Barnes took down the information and immediately radioed it to Sixth Army Headquarters. Shortly before seven the next morning, McGowen contacted Barnes and requested to be picked up by the PBY flying boat. The team paddled out and waited. But the pick up was a near disaster. The scheduled air cover had not arrived and both the Scouts and the plane were vulnerable to enemy fire. Not wanting to stay in one place too long, the pilot skimmed in fast and was still moving as the Scouts tried to board the aircraft. As McGowen tried to board the PBY, one of the propellers struck his cap, narrowly missing his head and tossing him backwards into the water. As Roberts was attempting to pull him into the boat, the other Scouts struggled aboard. Just as the plane accelerated, Gomez and the others pulled Roberts in the door. Fortunately, Roberts also had hold of McGowen.

The team arrived at Langemak Bay at 9:30 that morning and was met on the *Halfmoon* by Major Franklin Rawolle of Sixth Army Intelligence. Rawolle quickly ushered McGowen aboard a PT boat and rushed to him to meet Brig. Gen. William B. Chase aboard a destroyer. Upon hearing McGowen's report that the aerial reports were inaccurate, Chase, the reconnaissance force commander, requested that the Navy double the number of destroyers it had in the area and to direct more specific

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naval and air bombardment in the areas in which the Scouts had reconnoitered. Based on information obtained from the Scouts, the force also opted to change the invasion to the area which Ezaki had abandoned. This action resulted in a successful landing with light casualties. Meanwhile, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division cancelled a proposed reconnaissance-in-force of Manus Island and later conducted a major landing there. By March 25, organized Japanese resistance on the Admiralty Islands was broken, and the proposed landings at Kavieng and at Hansa Bay on the northern coast of New Guinea were cancelled in favor of an invasion at Hollandia, in Dutch New Guinea. Rabaul was effectively cut off and no longer posed a threat to the Allies.

The first Alamo Scouts mission was an outstanding success. Not only did it supply the Allies with vital pre-invasion intelligence which accelerated the capture of the Admiralty Islands and saved countless lives, it also validated Krueger's use of the Alamo Scouts and insured their continuation. But it wasn't perfect. The Scouts learned that flying boats were not the most practical way to insert a team, especially in broad daylight in full view of the enemy. During the takeoff and landing, the plane and the Scout team were exposed to the enemy. From then on Scouts were dropped off by submarine or PT boat. Communication was also a problem. Outfitted with only a "walkie-talkie," the team had difficulty contacting Barnes flying overhead. For future missions McGowen recommended that the Scouts carry a more powerful radio, if not two. Despite the glitches, the mission was everything that Krueger and Bradshaw had hoped for. To show his appreciation, Krueger presented each member of the MCGOWEN TEAM with the Silver Star. Although Mac-Arthur had awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Lt. Marvin J. Henshaw of the 5th Cavalry Regiment on February 29, for being the first American to land on Los

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Lt. John R. C. McGowen



Alamo Scout in Mission Attire

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Negros, the Scouts didn't mind. Everyone knew that they had been there forty-nine hours before anyone else.

ON TO NEW GUINEA

Just a few days after landing in the Admiralties the Alamo Scouts were at it again. This time the BARNES TEAM was called. This would be the Scouts' first mission of the New Guinea campaign. On the mainland, elements of the U.S. 32nd Division had driven the Japanese west from Saidor on the northeast coast of New Guinea towards Madang, where Australian forces were waiting. Sixth Army needed to know if the trapped Japanese were trying to escape by boat or if they were planning to fight it out.

Once the order was issued, Barnes prepared his team. Sixth Army had arranged for him to fly over the proposed landing area for a closer look. He recalled:

They put me in the nose of a B-25 and gave me a repeating camera. They took me down to the area I wanted to look at. It was pretty dense, but I wanted to look at the trail going down to the beach and the approximate vicinity where we were going to land. I took a bunch of photos. We took a real low sweep, just as low as you could get without being in the trees.

This time Lt. Michael J. (Iron Mike) Sombar, a muscular 25-year-old team leader, and three of his Scouts would go along as the contact team. They would take BARNES TEAM in by rubber boat and drop them off at the mouth of the Male River, which was midway between Saidor and Madang. At 10 p.m. on March 2, the Scouts departed by PT boat from Dregor Harbor and arrived at their offshore disembarkation point at 4:30 the next morning. Teeples of Barnes team recalled the event:

Our team rode in the hold of a PT boat to the disembarking point. The PT boat stopped about a

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hundred yards from shore and we all climbed into the rubber boat. As we got close to shore the surf caught us and spilled us out on the beach. It was dark when we landed and we lay on the beach until morning.

After making their way to shore at 5 a.m., Sombar and his men set up a defensive perimeter and waited to insure that the landing party had not been spotted. Sombar and his men wished BARNES TEAM luck and returned to the PT boat. Barnes quickly led his team into the jungle some fifty yards west of the river. There the Scouts began a four-hour trek inland to the coastal track, which they suspected was being used by the Japanese as an escape route to the west. Their suspicions were confirmed. Several tracks indicated that a large Japanese force had recently used the trail. After observing the track for fifteen minutes, the Scouts moved further inland into the hills behind Kumisanger, a nearby village.

Up to this time, the Scouts had not seen one enemy soldier, but that soon changed. As the team continued westward through a patch of kunai grass, lead Scout Warren Boes came face to face with a Japanese patrol. The Japanese men, dressed in green camouflaged uniforms, carried only two rifles and were laughing heartily. With only fifteen yards between him and patrol, Boes dropped to one knee and coolly opened fire killing three men. The rest escaped into the jungle. During the skirmish, Barnes and Boes, who were well ahead of the other Scouts, lost contact with the main body of the team. Fearing that a larger enemy force had heard the shooting, Barnes and Boes decided to continue with the mission and try to link up with the others later. They proceeded into the area behind Kumisanger and then on to Bibi, another small village, where they observed several small bivouac areas and three large ones.

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Meanwhile, the remaining Scouts, led by Pfc. Hall, raced west towards Bau Plantation. After a gruelling sprint through the jungle, the group stopped to eat and rest. Teeples added :

All our team had to eat on this mission was a mixture of raisins and peanuts. That was our typical ration on short missions, a blend of trail mix, figs, powdered milk, whatever we wanted to put into a little pouch that we had rigged up.

The next morning Hall's group was awakened by the roar of Australian planes. Bombs exploded around them and bullets ripped into the ground. The Scouts dove for cover and narrowly missed being hit. The Australians also thought that area would be a good place for enemy troops to rest. Not wanting to stay there for long, the Scouts waited for the planes to leave and resumed their recon of the plantation, only to find no trace of the enemy. From there they turned around and headed east towards the Male River, their predetermined rendezvous point.

That same morning, March 6, Barnes and Boes were met with a similar wake up call. "All hell broke loose," Barnes recalled. "Our own planes attacked us! One dropped a bomb less than fifty yards from me! Meanwhile, the rest of my team, which was further inland, was getting bombed and strafed as well." After the attack they headed east towards the rendezvous point. En route, the two-man party met up with elements of G Company, of the 126th Regimental Combat Team who were driving westward in pursuit of the retreating Japanese. After relaying what information they had, Barnes and Boes made their way to the Male River, where that afternoon they were again bombed and strafed by Allied planes. At 7:30 that evening, Hall and the others arrived at the mouth of the river. Ten hours later the haggard Scouts were on a PT boat headed for home.

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"We left our clothes on night and day," said Teeples. "We were wet at night and hot and sweaty during the day. We must not have smelled too good at the end because the sailors held their noses when they picked us up."

Barnes and Boes were taken to the Alamo Force Headquarters at Saidor, where they reported their findings to G-2 of the 32nd Division. The next day they were flown back to the Alamo Scouts Training Center for a well-earned rest.

On March 31, six days after the close of the Bismarck Archipelago campaign, the Alamo Scouts Training Center graduated its second class of Alamo Scouts. From this class, two more teams were formed bringing the total number of available teams to six. Two weeks earlier Sixth Army told Bradshaw to establish a new training center south of Finschafen on the northern coast of New Guinea, and to assign three teams of Scouts to General Robert Eichelberger's I Corps based on Goodenough Island. Lieutenant Thompson, Sombar, and Reynold's teams were selected to go and placed under the control of Lt. McGowen, who would act as the control officer.



Mayo S. Stuntz with the Duigi Family at Kalo Kalo, Fergusson Island, New Guinea. March 1944.

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Eichelberger planned to use the Scouts in the upcoming operation at Hollandia. While Bradshaw and Stuntz went to look at the new site, the rest of the camp personnel remained on Fergusson Island and began packing.

Once it was learned that the Scouts were leaving, the natives of Kalo Kalo threw them a memorable farewell party. Lewis Hochstrasser, a recent graduate of the training center and the newly-appointed adjutant, wrote of the incident:

A touching scene occurred the night before our departure. Out in the darkness along the track which led to numerous native villages we heard the thumping of native drums for an hour or more. We had heard them before, but never like this. It was if some message were being signaled. Then there were torches, as natives began to assemble ... a dozen boys ranging in age from six to twelve years, huddled in a conclave of low-voiced chattering and gesturing ... The act was a combination of song and dance. . . After the boys had done their bit, Priscilla, wife of the native missionary . . . appeared with her two daughters. Side by side they sat cross-legged and sang in harmony . . . 'The Old Rugged Cross' and 'God Bless America'... There was a sadness in her voice when she said 'Good luck and God bless you - brave soldiers.'⁵

On April 8, the last of the equipment was loaded on ships headed for the new campsite at Mange Point, ten miles southwest of Sixth Army Headquarters at Camp Cretin and some twenty miles southwest of Finschafen on the Lae-Finschafen trail. Two days later on April 10, the second Alamo Scouts Training Center was established. But there was a lot of work to do before it was ready. Tents had to be put up, water and electricity installed, a mess hall built, and tons of equipment organized. The site was in such a remote location that a road didn't even exist when

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the Scouts arrived. But putting up a new camp wasn't foremost in Bradshaw's mind. By now he had five teams of Alamo Scouts in the field and the invasion of Hollandia was fast approaching.

HOLLANDIA-AITAPE

Following the rapid Allied victory in the Admiralties, MacArthur turned his attention to Hollandia, the principal Japanese trans-shipment and rear supply base in New Guinea. The invasion was planned for April 22, and involved a 985-mile leap from Goodenough Island, the principal Allied staging area in the Southwest Pacific. The Allies also planned a simultaneous invasion of Aitape to trap the Eighteenth Japanese Army between the Aitape force and the advancing Australians.

MacArthur again called on Krueger to plan and coordinate the invasion. Krueger ordered the 24th Infantry Division, under Major General Frederick A. Irving, to land in Tanahmerah Bay, some twenty miles west of Hollandia, and seize all air bases and adjacent areas. Likewise, Krueger ordered the 41st Infantry Division (less the 163d RCT), under Major General Horace H. Fuller, to assault Hollandia from the east. Upon landing, the two task forces would converge in a pincer movement and trap the Japanese in the rugged Cyclops Mountains separating Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays. At the same time, elements of the 163rd Infantry (reinforced), under Brigadier General Jens A. Doe, were directed to land at Aitape, far to the east, and to seize the Tadji air bases.

Given their recent success on the Los Negros and Male River missions, the Alamo Scouts were called upon to reconnoiter the projected landing areas. Working from I Corps Headquarters at Pim Jetty, REYNOLDS, THOMPSON, and SOMBAR TEAMS were anxious to go on a mission. The teams had been attached to I Corps

Chapter Five

intelligence since late March and were champing at the bit. They finally got their chance at Hollandia.

At dawn on April 22, two teams of Alamo Scouts landed with the 158th "Bushmaster" Regiment at Hollandia. REYNOLDS TEAM, led by Lt. Gean H. Reynolds, landed near Demta, a small village west of Hollandia near Humboldt Bay, while THOMPSON TEAM, headed by Lt. George S. Thompson, landed at Tablasoefa, east of Tanahmerah Bay.

As REYNOLDS TEAM, consisting of Cpl. Winfred E. McAdoo, Pvt. William C. Gerstenberger, Staff Sgt. Leonard J. Scott, Cpl. William R. Watson, and Pvt. Lucian A. Jamison, would discover rubber boat landings were often more dangerous than the enemy. On their way to shore high surf dashed them into a thirty-foot cliff sinking the craft. Fortunately, the Scouts clung to the rocks and climbed up to a ridge where they spent the night. The next morning the team traveled to Moeris Besar, a small, Dutch coastal village approximately one mile south of Demta, where they discovered signs of Japanese atrocities. In one native hut they found three men lying dead on the floor. Two were Dutch officers and one was a civilian. The officers had been shot in the head and stomach, while the civilian had been brutally beaten in the face with a club. Under the hut, the Scouts discovered a nude male body which had been severely violated. Although wild dogs had eaten parts of the corpse, the Scouts noticed that the man had been castrated and his left hand cut off at the wrist.

From there the Scouts traveled to Demta, where they saw no signs of the enemy. After returning to a point midway between Demta and Moeris Besar, the team set up an observation post. Several hours of watching brought no results and the Scouts headed back to Moeris Besar, where they contacted a PT boat for pick up. Meanwhile, Thompson and his team, composed of Sgt. Theodore T. (Tiny) Largo, Pfc. Joshua Sunn, Pvt. Joseph A. Johnson,

Bismarck/New Guinea Campaigns

Pfc. Anthony Ortiz, and Sgt. Jack E. Benson, had been patrolling the area around Tablasoefa. But it was a dry run. After four days of looking for Japanese activity, they had seen only Americans.

Two days after the invasion three more teams of Scouts were on the move. SOMBAR TEAM and HOBBS TEAM both landed on White Beach with the invasion force, but had to wait until the 24th before taking off on a mission. The teams joined forces and went to Hollekang beach, where they expected to scout the trail leading from Hollekang to Tami Drome. After spending the first night bivouacked some 100 yards from their landing point, the teams moved out the following morning.

Once at Hollekang, the Scouts received a nondescript radio message cancelling the mission. But Lt. Woodrow Hobbs wasn't the type of man to sit still. Hobbs was named the top graduate of the American-Australian Commando School at Canungra, and was personally selected for Alamo Scouts training by General Innes P. Swift, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Hobbs took his team and two members of Sombar's team back along the beach and into a swamp some fifty yards inland. Hobbs' team was a well-seasoned group. Staff Sgt. Vern H. Miller, Sgts. Herman S. Chanley, Edgar G. Hatcher, John E. Phillips, and Private Joe (Pete) Moon were all graduates of the second training class. With them were Sgt. Virgil P. Howell and Pfc. Ora M. Davis, both of whom had a taste of scouting when they acted as the contact team during Barnes first mission near the Male River.

Meanwhile, Sombar and his team remained in the area for the day. The next morning they crossed the Laho River and followed the coast to Cape Kassoe, where they came upon two native shacks. One was abandoned, but the other had a saddled horse standing outside. Sombar knew that none of the natives would have a saddled horse, so he

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investigated. A quick look in the window said it all. Sombar pulled the pin on his grenade and tossed it through the window at a Japanese soldier who was sitting on a bed changing his clothes. The grenade exploded and Sombar rushed in only to find that the man was unharmed. Sombar delivered a crushing right to the man's jaw, dropping him to the floor. As the soldier attempted to get up, Sombar raised his carbine and fired.

From there Sombar led the team back to Hollekang, where he learned from the 2nd Battalion of the 34th Infantry of the plight of over 100 missionaries who had been held by the Japanese at Goya, some six miles inland. After three miles of slogging through knee-high mud, the team discovered an exhausted missionary who had been sent to find help. Sombar told Milda to take the missionary back to Hollekang, while the rest of the team continued to Goya. Three more gruelling miles brought the Scouts to the edge of the village. "Oh, it is so good to see a real man again!" exclaimed an elated nun as she threw her arms around the red-faced team leader.⁶

The remainder of the team fanned out and conducted a quick search of the village. Behind one of the huts the Scouts found a Japanese Naval officer sleeping soundly. He was now their prisoner. Weeks later, Sombar learned that the prisoner, Antonio Yenomi, had proudly beheaded an American Fifth Air Force officer at Wewak. Following a good night's rest, the team gathered its prisoner and three Polish missionaries to return with them to Hollekang. The party arrived at noon on April 27, and was greeted by HOBBS TEAM and soldiers of the 34th Division, who immediately sent men to Goya to evacuate the rest of the missionaries.

Back at the Alamo Scouts Training Center Lt. Henry L. Chalko was bored. A graduate of Harvard University, Chalko had joined the Naval Amphibious Scouts in July 1943 looking for action. When the Amphibious Scouts

SILENT WARRIORS

The Alamo Scouts, Sixth Army's Special Reconnaissance Unit of World War II, provided intelligence-gathering and tactical reconnaissance in the Pacific Theater. During the war, they performed over 106 successful missions in the Admiralty Islands, New Guinea and the Philippines, most deep behind enemy lines. The Scouts took part in liberating two P.O.W. camps.

The Scouts evolved from a simple reconnaissance unit to a sophisticated intelligence unit supplying and coordinating large-scale guerrilla operations on Leyte and Luzon. They did this without losing a man, killed or captured. The Scouts are now recognized as a forerunner of the modern Special Forces.

Lance Zedric breaks new ground in Silent Warriors ... Everyone can now discover that the Alamo Scouts are among the best special operations units of the U.S. or any other Army during World War II. Whatever your plans are for buying new books, put Silent Warriors on top of the list.

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The Silent Warriors of World War II makes an important addition to the history of our nation and does due credit to the fine men who made up the Alamo Scouts. William E. Colby, Former Director, C.I.A.

This is a long overdue story of a unique and barely understood form of warfare that was fought from the Southwest Pacific to

the shores of Japan. The Alamo Scouts were the forerunners to the Special Forces and Seals of today ... Thomas H. Moorer, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs

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of Staff.



the deserted beach, the small team moved stealthily along the trail until it reached its objective at 2:00 a.m. Two local guides were sent into the tiny village to obtain the lafest information on the enemy disposition and ascertain the status of the personnel held hostage there. On the guide's return, the team leader modified his original plan based on their information and the men dispersed to take up their positions.

The leader with six team members, the interpreter, and three local guides moved to the vicinity of a large building where eighteen enemy soldiers slept inside. Two team members and one native guide took up a position near a small building occupied by two enemy intelligence officers and a captured local official. The assistant team leader, four men, and two guides were to neutralize an enemy outpost located more than two miles away on the main road to the village. The outpost was manned by four soldiers with two machine guns. This team would attack when they heard the main element initiate their assault in the village.

The team leader opened fire on the main building at 4:10 a.m. and within three minutes his team killed or wounded all the enemy combatants. The two enemy officers in the small hut were killed and their hostage released. In the village, the interpreter and the native guides went from hut to hut gathering the sixty-six civilian hostages. As soon as everyone was accounted for, the group began moving to the pickup point on the beach. The assistant team leader and his men were unable to hear the brief gun



Nellist Team after the Oransbari Rescue mission. Pictured L to R, back row, Andy E. Smith, Galen C. Kittleson, William E. Nellist, kneeling, front row, Wilbert C. Wismer, Sabas A. Asis and Thomas A. Siason. Taken New Years Day, 1945 on Leyte, Milppine24land 1282 Document 207-2

battle in the village and waited until 5:30 before attacking the guard post from two sides, killing the four enemy soldiers. After neutralizing the guard post, the team moved to the pick-up point, secured the area, and made radio contact to bring in the boats for the evacuation. The main body with the newly-freed hostages soon arrived. By 7:00 a.m., everyone was safely inside friendly lines.¹

This well-planned, flawlessly executed hostage rescue could easily have come from today's war on terrorism. In reality, it took place on 4 October 1944 at Cape Oransbari, New Guinea. The team that rescued sixty-six Dutch and Javanese hostages from the Japanese were part of the Sixth U.S. Army's Special Reconnaissance Unit, called the Alamo Scouts. This article will look at the formation, training, and missions of that unique special operations unit.

The Japanese Advance


Following the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese military was on the march. The Imperial Army had been fighting in Manchuria since 1931 and was a veteran, battle-tested force. The Japanese grand strategy was to drive the European nations from their colonial holdings in Asia and implement the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, an involuntary assembly of Asian nations under Japanese domination. In December 1941, Nazi Germany occupied the Netherlands and France,



The Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi was sunk by aerial attack at the Battle of Midway. To the left a Japanese destroyer maneuvers to avoid the American aircraft. The defeat at Midway spelled the end of the Japanese expansion.

and the British Commonwealth was locked in a struggle with the Axis. The United States was preoccupied with building up its own military forces and providing war materials to the embattled British. Japan chose this time to launch their attack on Pearl Harbor, and begin offensive operations throughout East Asia. The initial months of the war were a string of unbroken Japanese victories.

August 1942 was the high-water mark for the Japanese military. The Imperial Army captured Malaya and Filed 02/06/25 Page 30 of 45 Page D #. 669



General Douglas A. MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area. The red line shows the limit of advance of the Japanese military in 1942. MacArthur's campaign strategy was to retake New Guinea and move north and recapture the Philippines prior to the assault on the Japanese home islands.

Singapore, occupied Borneo, Sumatra, and Java in the Dutch East Indies, and marched into Thailand. They pushed the British out of Burma, and dealt the United States a major defeat in the Philippines. Japanese forces swept south and east into New Guinea, where they established major bases at Rabaul on New Britain Island, and Tulagi in the Solomon Group and occupied the Marshall and Gilbert Islands in eastern Micronesia. They pushed north to seize Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians. Their forces were threatening Australia when the U.S. Navy decisively defeated the Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. On 7 August 1942, the United States and her allies attacked Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Tanambogo, effectively checking further Japanese expansion.² From this point on, the Japanese were forced to adopt a defensive posture to consolidate their holdings and prepare to fight off the growing strength of the Allies.


Maritime operations against the Japanese took place in two theaters. The Southeast Asia Command was under British control and led by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. The Pacific Theater was divided into two areas. The largest was the vast Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) commanded by Admiral (ADM) Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, The POA extended from the continental United States westward across the ocean to Japan and included most of the Pacific islands. The South Pacific area was commanded by Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley. The second subdivision, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), encompassed Australia, New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines and was under the command of General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur.³ It was in the SWPA that the Alamo Scouts were created and operated.

The SWPA and Sixth Army

After his evacuation from the Philippines to Australia in March 1942, GEN MacArthur, was installed as the Commander in Chief of the SWPA, a joint command composed of United States, Australian, and Dutch forces. Of the major theaters of World War II, only the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) was more poorly resourced than the SWPA. MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) directed three subordinate sections, the Allied Air Forces (Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, U.S. Army Air Forces), Allied Land Forces (General Sir Thomas A. Blamey, Australian Army) and the Allied Naval Forces, (Rear Admiral Arthur S. Carpender, U.S. Navy).⁴ In January 1943, MacArthur specifically requested that his long-standing friend Lieutenant General (LTG) Walter Krueger be assigned to command the newly constituted Sixth Army.⁵ In a move designed to keep the bulk of the American ground troops separate from the Allied Land Filed 02/06/25 Page 31 of 45 PageID #: 670

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The campaign in New Guinea. LTG Krueger's Alamo Force executed a series of amphibious landings along the northern coast of New Guinea. The Alamo Scouts conducted 40 reconnaissance missions on the landing beaches and the off-shore islands in support of Alamo Force.

Forces, MacArthur established a new command, the New Britain Force, around the Sixth U.S. Army, reporting directly to SWPA GHQ.⁶ The name was soon changed to the Alamo Force, because Sixth Army originally stood up in San Antonio, Texas, the home of the Alamo. LTG Krueger noted:

The reason for creating Alamo Force and having it, rather than Sixth Army, conducting operations was not divulged to me. But it was plain that this arrangement would obviate placing Sixth Army under the operational control of the CG, Allied Land Forces, although that Army formed a part of these forces. Since the CG, Allied Land Forces, likewise could not exercise administrative control of Sixth Army, it never came under his command at all.⁷

General MacArthur's strategy in the SWPA was to conduct a series of amphibious landings along the northern coast of New Guinea, capture the Japaneseheld islands of the New Britain archipelago and destroy the major Japanese naval base at Rabaul. This would eliminate the Japanese threat to Australia and begin the process of recapturing the Philippines prior to assaulting the Japanese home islands. From July through September, 1942, Australian troops on New Guinea fought the Japanese between Port Moresby and the northern coast. The attack followed the treacherous Kokoda Trail across the towering Owen Stanley Mountains. The enemy's final attempt to consolidate his holdings on New Guinea's northern coast was repulsed at Milne Bay.⁹ Fierce fighting led to Allied victories at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda. The Japanese penetration along the New Guinea coast and the occupation of Solomon Islands were disrupted. The Allies began to roll them back when the Sixth Army commenced operation 1282 Document 207-2

The Japanese still occupied the majority of northeastern New Guinea, with strongholds at Lae and Salamaua. LTG Krueger's Alamo Force launched an offensive in June 1943, landing on Woodlark and Kiriwina islands on 30 June.¹⁰ Airfields were rapidly built on these islands. The Allies began to move methodically up the northeastern coast of New Guinea, capturing Lae and Salamaua and executing amphibious landings further westward. For the Army,



L to R: LTG Walter Krueger, MG Franklin C. Sibert, RADM William M. Fechetler, BG Charles E. Hardis, New Guinea. General MacArthur said of General Krueger, "He was swift and sure in attack; tenacious and determined in defense; modest and restrained in victory-I don't know what he would have been in defeat because be was peoperdefeated by #: 671

When LTG Krueger arrived in Australia in February, 1943, Sixth Ărmy contained I Corps, the 32nd and 41st Infantry Divisions, the 1st Marine Division (under Army operational control), the 158th Infantry Regiment, the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 40th and 41st Antiaircraft Brigades, the 98th Field Artillery Battalion, (Pack) and the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. The 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions joined Sixth Army in May and July, 1943 respectively. By November 1944, prior to the invasion of the Philippines, the Alamo Force (Sixth Army) had grown considerably. It now included the X Corps composed of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division and the 6th Cavalry Regiment and the XXIVth Corps, made up of the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Airborne Division, the 20th Armored Group, and the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. Included in the Sixth Army troop lists were the 32nd and

77th Infantry Divisions, the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, the 21st and 381st Infantry Regiments and the 6th Ranger Battalion.⁸





Troops of the 32nd Infantry Division cross a bridge in the jungle during the battle of Buna in New Guinea, November 1942. The 32nd was a Sixth Army unit in the Alamo Force.


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amphibious operations on this large scale were a new experience, and there were many lessons to be learned. It was during the conduct of these early battles that LTG Krueger saw the need for more accurate timely intelligence, and ground reconnaissance of the landing areas.

The Birth of the Alamo Scouts

Intelligence about the enemy disposition and the conditions on the ground on the New Guinea mainland were hard to come by. Aerial overflights were not effective in piercing the thick jungle that began at the edge of the beaches, and there was no human intelligence network in place in the Japanese-occupied areas. In the other theaters of World War II, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) provided much of this tactical intelligence. Douglas A. MacArthur specifically prohibited the OSS from conducting operations in the SWPA. He would not allow any organizations in his theater that did not report directly to him.¹¹ In July 1942, in an attempt to address the intelligence shortfalls, GEN MacArthur established an organization to collect information through clandestine operations behind enemy lines. The Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) incorporated several looselyknit organizations, including the Australian "Coast Watchers" and made an effort to insert agents with radios by submarine.¹² The Navy also established a short-lived organization, the Amphibious Scouts, on Fergusson Island in July 1943 to conduct reconnaissance of the landing beaches. The Amphibious Scouts included several Army personnel. The unit was disbanded in December 1943. The innovative Krueger, conscious of the intelligence failures that occurred before the battles on Kiska Island in the Aleutians and at Guadalcanal, took steps to acquire his own intelligence gathering capability.¹³

LTG Krueger said, "The trouble that we had met in getting information of the enemy and our objective area



Australian "Coast Watchers" in late 1943. The civilian Coast Watchers were later incorporated into the Australian Navy and were a vital part of MacArthur's Allied Intelligence Bureau. One of the few American Coast Watchers, Frank Nash is seated on the right, bottom row. Filed 02/06/25 Page 33 of 45 PageID #: 672

LTC Frederick Bradshaw (r) with LTC Sylvester Smith of Sixth Army G-2 on the boat dock at the Alamo Scout Training Center (ASTC), Fergusson Island, New Guinea. Bradshaw, a lawyer from Mississippi, formed the ASTC and served as the first director.



prompted me to issue orders on 28 November 1943 establishing a training center near Headquarters, Alamo Force for training selected individuals in reconnaissance and raider work."¹⁴ Sixth Army General Order 353-B established the Alamo Scout Training Center (ASTC) to provide trained reconnaissance troops to Sixth Army units. Krueger shrewdly used his prerogative as an Army commander to establish a training center instead of trying to create a new unit, an option that required approval by the Army General Staff. Krueger also converted the 98th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) into the 6th Ranger Battalion when the need for a raiding capability was identified.

LTC Frederick W. Bradshaw, the Sixth Army Assistant G-2 was selected to command the ASTC. The self-effacing former lawyer from Mississippi was initially assisted by Major (MAJ) John F. Polk from the 1st Cavalry Division. Polk soon moved into the role of liaison with Sixth Army Headquarters and Bradshaw picked Captain (CPT) Homer A. Williams to be his executive officer. A gruff personality and a strict disciplinarian, Williams was the perfect counter-weight to the quiet, good-humored Bradshaw. Bradshaw made equally good choices with his other staff officers.

A critical position in establishing and maintaining the school was the supply officer. Bradshaw recruited First Lieutenant (1LT) Mayo S. Stuntz who had served in the Amphibious Scouts. An inveterate "scrounger", Stuntz was able to work wonders in the logistically constrained environment of the SWPA, provided, "no questions were asked."¹⁵ In addition to building his staff, Bradshaw was on the look-out for a location for the school. It was likely to be a "bare-bones" operation.

The Sixth Army orders establishing the ASTC required Bradshaw to have the school set-up and training its first class by 1 January 1944 at a location in the vicinity of Sixth Army Headquarters, then on Goodenough Island off the east coast of New Guinea. The mosquitoinfested swamps and rough surf around Goodenough Island offered no suitable locations for the school. On 30 November, Bradshaw dispatched two former Amphibious Scouts, Lieutenants Daily P. Gambill and Milton Beckworth, and two enlisted men to follow up a rumor that the Navy reconnaissance unit was being disbanded. They had a camp on Fergusson Island.¹⁶ The rumor proved true, and on 3 December 1943, Bradshaw and his staff moved to what would be the first of five homes of the ASTC. The school would run until after the end of the war, closing in September 1945.

The native village of Kalo Kalo sits on a quiet bay on the northwest coast of Fergusson Island. Only a 30-minute boat ride from Sixth Army Headquarters, the spot was ideal. It provided good areas for training in the jungle surrounding the village and easy access to the ocean for amphibious training in rubber boats. LTG Krueger sent construction engineers to build classrooms, a supply room, boat docks and a 50-man dining hall, all properly screened with cement floors. 1LT Stuntz "found" a kerosene – powered refrigerator, generators, and electric lights for the camp, a radio and movie projector for the dayroom, and a host of other amenities. 1LT William Barnes, who graduated in the first class recalled, "We had a wonderful setup on Fergusson Island. It was the nicest of all the camps. Stuntz rigged up a latrine and even managed to find a couple of toilet seats. That's probably the reason the men called the camp the 'Hotel Alamo'."¹⁷

As the construction of the camp continued, LTC Bradshaw began to fill out his instructor corps. The demise of the Amphibious Scouts provided him with several soldiers who had served in the Navy recon unit.

"the men called the camp the 'Hotel Alamo'." —1LT William Barnes

On 27 December 1943, a month after the order establishing the ASTC, the first class of Alamo Scouts began training at Fergusson Island.

Alamo Scout Training and Selection Candidates for the Alamo Scouts came from units

within the Sixth Army, initially from the 32nd Infantry



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
98th Field Artillery



6th Ranger Page 34 ଶିମ୍ୟର୍ଶ୍ୱାହ୍ୟରୁଟୋର୍ଫ #: 673

Division (32nd ID) and 158th Regimental Combat Team (the Bushmasters). The Scouts were all volunteers, and units were tasked to screen candidates for suitability prior to sending their names forward. LTG Krueger's influence was felt down to the lowest level. 1LT Robert Sumner volunteered for the Scouts in April 1944. "The Army Commander, General Krueger, insisted on quality people to begin with, and took a personal interest that quality people were made available. This is very clearly stated in his original order. So the commanders knew that the old man would look askance on this thing if a bunch of turkeys kept turning up all the time. So, you got a pretty good guy," said Sumner.¹⁸

Nineteen year-old Private First Class (PFC) Galen C. Kittleson won a Silver Star on Noemfoor Island with the 503rd Parachute Infantry. He "volunteered" for the Alamo Scouts with little knowledge of




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1LT Mayo Stuntz with 1LT Rafael Ileto at the last ASTC on Luzon, Philippine Islands. Stuntz was the ASTC Supply Officer renowned for his ability to "scrounge necessities." Rafael Îleto was a West Point graduate who later rose to be Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army and Secretary of National Defense.




The first Alamo Scout Training Center at Kalo Kalo was nicknamed the "Hotel Alamo." The industrious 1LT Mayo Stuntz had provided the camp with refrigeration, electricity, and other amenities not seen in the SWPA Theater. The sign travelled to subsequent camps.



1LT Myron Beckwith was an Army veteran of the Navy's Amphibious Scouts. As an instructor at the ASTC, he demonstrates the operation of a special waterproof radio to be used by the reconnaissance teams.




Major Homer "Red" Williams was the executive officer for LTC Bradshaw before becoming the ASTC director. A no-nonsense disciplinarian, Williams was an effective counter-part to the Caseft35294key-01282 Document 207-2



Trainees at the first Alamo Scout Training Center on Fergusson Island, New Guinea. The training center would be established in five separate locations in New Guinea and the Philippines as the Southwest Pacific Campaign unfolded. A total of eight classes were completed, and a ninth was cut short in September 1945, after the Japanese surrender.

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THE PARTY OF



There were *five separa*te Alamo Scout Training Centers *established between December 1943 and September 1945. Camp 1 - Kalo Kalo on Fergusson Island, New Guinea.*

- 27 Dec 43 31 Mar 44, Classes 1 and 2. Camp 2 - Mange Point, Finschafen, New Guinea.
- 15 May 44 22 Jun 44, Class 3. Camp 3 - Cape Kassoe, Hollandia, New Guinea.
- 31 Jul 44 28 Oct 44, Classes 4 and 5.
- Camp 4 Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines. 26 Dec 44 – 1 Jun 45, Class 6. Camp 5 - Mabayo (Subic Bay), Luzon, Philippines. 23 Apr 45 – 2 Sep 45, Classes 7 and 8.

the unit. "I and a Lieutenant Cole from the 503rd were told, 'We are going to send you to a recon school because you are a scout.' I didn't really know what the hell the Alamo Scouts were. I thought, well I suppose the more I can learn, the better off I'll be. They really didn't say it was voluntary, either."¹⁹ SGT Zeke (Chief Thunderbird) McConnell, a Native American Cherokee with the 40th Infantry Division on New Britain recalls "My Colonel came up and said, 'You're an Indian. How would you like to go to Scout training? Then you can come back and show us how to do it."²⁰ Unfortunately for the Colonel, McConnell remained with the Alamo Scouts when he completed the course. Volunteer or not, everyone went through a rigorous six-week training program.

The Alamo Scout course was designed to maximize the soldier's ability to penetrate behind enemy lines and gather accurate, timely intelligence. Heavy emphasis was placed on the skills necessary for a successful recon patrol. 1LT Robert Sumner went through the ASTC after attending a company commander's course at Fort



The Alamo Scout Training Center at Cape Kassoe, Hollandia, New Guinea. Classes #4 and 5 were run from this facility between August and November 1944. Later training centers were not as plush as the original "Hotel Alamo."

Benning, GA. "The training program [at the ASTC] was an advanced sort of proposition. We had all the basic training, of course, in map reading, area photography, individual weapons. However, at the Scout Training Center, your training was detail work on reading maps and reading aerial photography."²¹ The nature of the Scout mission, amphibious insertion onto the landing beaches, dictated that a major portion of the training be devoted to the use of rubber boats.

The Alamo Scouts depended on small inflatable rubber boats (RB-7's) for their entry into enemy territory. "I think the rubber boat training was the easiest part, but we practiced it a lot," said Galen Kittleson. "We went out into the ocean and worked with those waves coming in. Because if you don't know a little bit about it, you turn sideways and you're automatically capsized."²²

Scouts were also expected to be proficient open water swimmers. Corporal (CPL) Andrew E. Smith remembers an unusual training exercise. "There were two taped off areas in the bay. You went under water at one end and they [the cadre] told us, 'Now don't come up until you get to the other one because there are going to be bullets hitting the water.' It was ninety or a hundred yards."²³

Every aspect of patrolling, including conducting operations in the tropical jungle, was addressed in the training. Sumner said "There was an Australian officer, a Lieutenant Ray Watson who was attached to the Scouts as one of the training cadre. He had his own native police boys with him. In their pidgin English, they gave us instruction in jungle survival."²⁴ 1LT Tom Rounsaville described the training "as nothing really new. It was just concentrated, a hell of a lot of physical stuff, a lot of work in the water because we were going to be working in the water a lot. And stuff like map reading and patrolling, [for] the first ten days or two weeks."²⁵ "The physical training aspect was called Ju-Jitsu, and we had a young fellow who was one of the very, very few American brown-belters. We're

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talking the 1940's, and he was very good," said Robert Sumner.²⁶ Not everyone had a positive experience with the physical training. "They paired me with big Gib [Gilbert] Cox," said Andrew Smith. "He was a football player from Oregon State and he threw me around like a pretzel. Then he'd say, did I hurt you, Smitty?"²⁷

The six week training program of the Alamo Scouts involved an initial period devoted to classroom and hands-on instruction. "The classroom portion was very detailed and went on until 2200 [hours] each night. [It was] four weeks of this training, from 0800 to 2200 at night. Classroom [work] with practical training on the ground. Then we went into a series of exercises," said Robert Sumner.²⁸ Each class of students was divided into teams of one officer with five or six enlisted men and the members were rotated throughout the training. This was by design and supported one of the unique selection aspects of the Alamo Scouts.

1LT Robert Sumner went through the fourth class at the ASTC. "Everybody trained with everybody else during this entire period, so that you would get to know other men and they would get to know you. There was a logical reason for this, which we were unable to see to begin with."²⁹ The reason became clear when it was time to execute the culminating exercise of each class.



Alamo Scout training was arduous and intensive, concentrating on reconnaissance techniques and honing the men's ability to move through the jungle. Here trainees at the ASTC at Kalo Kalo conduct a forced march on Fergusson Island, New Guinea, February **1944**.



A member of Littlefield Team, Native American SSG Zeke McConnell participated In over a dozen missions in New Guinea and the Philippines. Shown here after the war, Staff Sergeant McConnell wears the Alamo Scout patch on his right shoulder.



LTG Walter Krueger congratulates SGT Gilbert Cox after awarding him the Silver Star. PFC Galen C. Kittleson, also a Silver Star recipient is in the background. Leyte, Philippines, 1944.



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


503rd Parachute



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Trainees of ASTC Class #4 at Hollandia, New Guinea were instructed in Ju-Jitsu as part of the physical training program. The training was taught by one of the few Americans qualified in this form of martial arts.



20.577



Alamo Scout trainees had to swim an underwater course under fire. Here 1LT Preston Richard fires at the surface with a Thompson sub-machinegun. LTC Frederick Bradshaw, ASTC Director (hands on hips), and MG Innis P. Swift, commander of I Corps (in helmet) observe the training, ASTC Fergusson Island, January 1944.


In a rare example of a unit conducting training in enemy-occupied terrain, the Scouts ran their final exercise in disputed areas. "At the end of the class, they would break us out into teams and send us on a mission, usually into some of the areas that were recently taken over by us. I mean there were still some Japanese in them, but they were kind of a virgin area," said 1LT Tom Rounsaville.³⁰ Sergeant (SGT) Gilbert Cox remembers his team going onto the New Guinea mainland. "We ran a mission back to the Tami-Avery Trail that the Japanese were using



A Scout team at the 1st ASTC prepares to conduc

ASTC prepares to conduct a night reconnaissance. Front L-R, PFC Joseph Johnson, 1LT Michael Sombar and CPL David Milda. Back L-R, SGT Byron Tsingine, SSG Alvin Vilcan, CPL John A. Roberts, CPL Walter A. MacDonald and SSG Caesar Ramirez, 8 January 1944.

The graduation certificate of SGT Zeke McConnell of Littlefield Team. The certificate reads "Excellent-Alamo Scout." If the rating Excellent or Superior appeared on the certificate, the individual was retained on a Scout team. If not, he returned to his unit.



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An Alamo Scout Team, (most likely Dove Team) lands from a Landing Craft-Vehicle on the rocky coast near Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea. The team was scouting the area prior to the amphibious landings to seize Hollandia, June 1944.

to cross the Owen Stanley Mountains. We saw a few dead guys that didn't make it."³¹ At the conclusion of these exercises, each man was given an opportunity to evaluate his fellow classmates.

Using a secret ballot, each enlisted man was asked to rank in order of preference, the officer he would most like to serve under, and the five other enlisted men he wanted on his team. Officers were asked to provide the names of five enlisted men they would like to have on their team, in rank order. CPL Andrew Smith said," I was to put on a piece of paper, the person I would most like to associate with on missions. Of course, there wasn't a man who graduated that I wouldn't gladly go with."³² These peer evaluations were combined with a cadre assessment of each man. The projected mission requirements of Sixth Army determined who and how many Alamo Scouts would come from each class.³³ Who was selected was not revealed until the graduation ceremony.

"On graduation day, we formed up in platoons, about an eight or nine-man squad with the lieutenant standing at the end. All the cadre officers were there, all lined up neatly. The director of training would make a few remarks, you know, the usual hype, and then the graduation exercise would start. The young officer was called forward. He marches up, salutes the director, and receives his diploma. And this was the first time you would know if you had been selected," said Robert Sumner.³⁴ If the words "Superior or Excellent - Alamo Scout" appeared on the diploma, the man was retained at the ASTC. If his diploma read "Alamo Scout", he was a successful course graduate, but returned to his unit. On average, between 20 and 25 Scouts were selected from each class,


selected out of the first five classes conducted operations supporting Sixth Army as it moved up the northern coast of New Guinea.

The New Guinea Missions

The first Alamo Scout mission was conducted on 27 and 28 February, 1944 by 1LT John R. C. McGowen's team. Alamo Scout teams were generally identified by the team leader's name. McGowen Team was to conduct a pre-invasion reconnaissance of Los Negros Island in the Admiralty Island chain. Transported by Catalina PBY Flying Boat, the team encountered bad weather that delayed the insertion until dawn was breaking. The Scouts identified the Japanese positions and pinpointed their areas of concentration, information that proved invaluable for selecting the bombing targets for the invasion. On the exfiltration, the nervous pilot refused to slow the aircraft sufficiently to allow the team, barely able to clamber aboard the moving PBY, to recover their rubber boat. The mission of McGowan Team validated



LTG Walter Krueger inspecting trainees at the Alamo Scout Training Center. Corporal Robert Beattle is in the foreground.



A Consolidated PBY Catalina Flying Boat was used to insert and extract the McGowen Team on Los Negros Island.

the Alamo Scout program and led to, among other lessons learned, the abandonment of the "Flying Boat" as a means of delivering teams. Subsequent missions went in by submarine or Navy Patrol Torpedo (PT) boat.³⁵

Nearly forty Alamo Scout missions on the mainland of New Guinea and nearby islands were run by seventeen teams from the first five graduating classes of the ASTC.³⁶ With the exception of the rescue of the civilian detainees at Cape Oransbari, reconnaissance was the primary mission of these teams. LTG Krueger took a close personal interest in the Scout operations. PFC Gil Cox said, "When we were planning for a mission, LTG Krueger often briefed the teams himself."³⁷ Dove, Nellist, and Rounsaville Teams were combined for one of the final missions in New Guinea, the Cape Oransbari rescue described at the beginning of this article.³⁸ When the tide of battle shifted from New Guinea to the Philippines, the mission of the Alamo Scouts changed.

Unlike New Guinea and the adjacent off-shore islands, the Philippines had well-developed resistance movements of Filipinos and Americans. Men such as LT Donald Blackburn, LTC Wendell Fertig, and MAJ Russell Volkmann stayed behind following the surrender of the U.S. forces in May 1942. They fled to the interior regions and waged guerrilla warfare against the Japanese Army. When the United States began landing on the different Philippine islands, the guerrillas increased their activity against the Japanese, necessitating the need for communication between the guerrillas and the U.S. Army. While still continuing their reconnaissance missions, the new mission for the Alamo Scouts was to be the liaison between these resistance groups and the Sixth Army.

The Philippines


The U.S. strategy for liberating the Philippines involved initial landings on the island of Leyte in October 1944, followed by landings on Mindanao and Samar before finally capturing Luzon and the capitol city of Manila.³⁹ The capture of Leyte, located in the center of the Philippine Archipelago, allowed the U.S. to build airfields and achieve air superiority over the entire region. On 17 October 1944, the first U.S. forces, the 6th Ranger Battalion, landed on Homonhan and Suluan Islands which guarded the approaches to Leyte Gulf and the island's capitol of Tacloban.⁴⁰ Alamo Scout teams were actively involved in the landings, providing reconnaissance of the beaches and intelligence on the enemy disposition.

Following the initial landings, Alamo Scout teams were inserted to reconnoiter future landing beaches. Littlefield Team and McGowen Team were inserted at Palo, on Leyte. Nellist Team landed on Mindanao and Sumner Team on Samar at the same time.⁴¹ These missions were all of two to three days in length. Later liaison missions were of much greater duration.

The team of 1LT Woodrow E. Hobbs was inserted at Cananga on Leyte on 12 November 1944 and remained on the island until 5 December. 1LT Robert Case 3:24-cv-01282 Document 207-2




Alamo Scout Team Leaders following an awards ceremony at Leyte, Philippines in December 1944. L-R, 1LT William Nellist, 1LT Thomas Rounsaville, 1LT Robert Sumner, and 1LT John Dove.



The Navy's Patrol Torpedo (PT) boats were the primary vessel used to insert Alamo Scout teams. Swift and maneuverable, the 80-foot craft were ideal for the mission of dropping off and recovering the teams.

Sumner's team returned from Samar and went into the strategically critical Ormoc Valley on Leyte on 6 November, remaining until withdrawn on 22 December, when major combat operations ceased and the mopping up phase on Leyte began.⁴² When the Sixth Army began the invasion of the main island of Luzon, the primary Scout missions were liaison.

The invasion of Luzon commenced on 9 January 1945 in Lingayen Gulf northwest of Manila, and set off the most intense period of Alamo Scout activity. 1LT Robert Sumner was part of the Luzon operations. "We did not put anyone ashore prior to the landings in Luzon. Obviously the G2 [intelligence officer] didn't feel it was necessary; and I think they were absolutely right. The guerrilla forces furnished all of the responses to the Filed 02/06/25 Page 40 of 45 PageID #: 679



The campaign to retake the Philippines was divided between the Eighth Army and the Sixth Army. Seventeen Alamo Scout teams conducted more than 70 missions in support of the two Armies. In the Philippines, the Scouts added liaison with the guerrilla units to their reconnaissance mission.

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EEI [essential elements of information]," said Sumner.⁴³ Instead, the Alamo Scout teams were ferried in Landing Craft Infantry (LCIs) to Lingayen after the initial assault to link up at the Sixth Army forward command post (CP). "We assembled at the Sixth Army jump CP in the morning after the landings. From then on we were fully employed. We were off and running. A couple of the teams worked their way on up into the northern part of Luzon and were up there three and four months at a time," Sumner said.⁴⁴

William Nellist's team was sent southeast to the Legaspi-Sorsogon Peninsula on 9 February to establish contact with guerrilla groups in the vicinity and reconnoiter the landing areas for the insertion of the 158th Regimental Combat Team (158th RCT). CPL Andrew Smith relates that the team was divided up to cover multiple locations. "They split our team up in Tagay and Bulan one time. And they left me in the middle. [SGT Galen] Kittleson, [Staff Sergeant Thomas] Siason, and [1LT William] Nellist went over the mountain to the Pacific side and the rest went out to Bulan. I accused Nellist of leaving me by myself and he said, 'Well, hell, you were only there for thirty days.' Thirty days is a long time to not have someone that speaks your language or [provide you with] something to eat."45 1LT Nellist experienced difficulties with rival guerrilla groups and, on order from Sixth Army, took over control of all guerrilla operations on the peninsula.⁴⁶ He remained in charge of the guerrillas until 1 April. With the arrival of the 158th RCT, Nellist Team turned over the liaison mission to the 158th and returned to the Army headquarters. It was the Nellist Team along with the Rounsaville and Dove Teams that took part in the most famous Alamo Scout mission, the rescue of the prisoners from the Cabanatuan Prison Camp.

The two Alamo Scout teams worked with the 6th Ranger Battalion and a Filipino guerrilla force under Captain Eduardo Joson to rescue 513 American and British prisoners from their camp at Cabanatuan, then thirty miles inside Japanese lines.⁴⁷ The rapid advance of Sixth Army imperiled the POWs in Japanese hands. The mission was planned and executed on very short notice between 27 January and 1 February 1945. The Rounsaville and Nellist Teams with guerrilla guides negotiated the 30 miles to the vicinity of the POW camp and linked–up with the main Philippine guerrilla unit. The Scouts placed the camp under surveillance on the 29th and 30th as the guerrillas moved into blocking positions near the camp. Dove Team accompanied C Company of the 6th Ranger Battalion and arrived at the Camp on the 29th. Based on the intelligence gathered by the Nellist and Rounsaville teams, LTC Henry Mucci, the 6th Ranger Battalion commander, agreed to wait one day for Japanese units traversing the area to move on before attempting the rescue. On the 30th, the forces hit the camp at 7:45 p.m., killing the 200 Japanese guards and rescuing the prisoners. In thirty minutes, the prisoners, escorted by the Rangers, were on their way back to friendly lines, Document 207-2 Case 3:24-cv-01282

while the Alamo Scouts provided security to cover the withdrawal.⁴⁸ The success of this mission generated such publicity that SGT Harold Hard and SGT Gilbert Cox were sent back to the United States with twelve of the Rangers to meet President Roosevelt and take part in a War Bond drive.⁴⁹ The campaign for the capture of Luzon would last until nearly the end of the war and involve the Alamo Scouts in increasingly complex missions.




6th Rangers move through the grass to take up positions prior to the raid on the Cabanatuan Prison compound. The Nellist and Rounsaville Teams with Filipino guides led the Rangers into position and covered the retreat of the 513 POWs after the successful rescue.



Following the successful Cabanatuan Prison Rescue, a select group of Rangers and Alamo Scouts were brought back to the United States to participate in a War Bond drive. Here the men meet with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the White House. Alamo Scouts SGT Harold Hard, Rounsaville Team (5th from left) and SGT Gilbert Cox, Nellist Team (far right) were part of the publicity campaign surrounding Filedthe Successful Fescle, March 1945.ageID #: 681

14 Veritas



LTG Krueger took Alamo Scout Teams with him from the Philippines to Japan after the surrender in August 1945. Adkins Team performed a reconnaissance of the Wakayama landing beach and Derr Team provided personal security for Krueger.

Until July 1945, when Sixth Army turned over control of operations in Luzon to Eighth Army to begin preparations for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, the Alamo Scouts were continually employed. The teams gathered intelligence on Japanese strengths and locations, set up communications sites and advised and supplied guerrilla units in central and northern Luzon. When not engaged in operations behind the Japanese lines, Alamo Scout teams acted as the personal security detachment for LTG Krueger on his forays away from Sixth Army headquarters.

On to Japan

General Walter Krueger held the Alamo Scouts in high esteem, and from the inception of the unit, employed a team as his security detachment. The final Alamo Scout mission involved the teams of 1LT George A. Derr, 1LT Henry A. Adkins and 1LT Martin Grimes who had taken over the Shirkey Team. They sailed from Manila with Krueger on 14 September 1945 bound for Japan. About twenty Alamo Scouts were part of the Sixth Army GHQ. The Derr Team accompanied Krueger when he took control of the Sasebo Naval Air Base on 20 September. Later Grimes Team toured Nagasaki with LTG Krueger. SGT Gilbert Cox recalled, "We were just in and out of Nagasaki. The people were still staggering around. It was a mess. Ground Zero was nothing but red dirt, and maybe a chimney standing here or there."50 When the Sixth Army convoy landed at the port city of Wakayama on 25 September 1945, members of the Case 3:24-cv-01282 Document 207-

The 6th Ranger Battalion

The 6th Ranger Battalion was created in December 1943 at the direction of General Douglas A. MacArthur, who saw the need for a Ranger force to replicate the Marine Raider battalions in the Pacific Theater.¹ LTG Walter Krueger, the Sixth Army commander, converted the 98th Field Artillery Battalion (75mm Pack Howitzers) into a provisional Ranger Battalion. The mission of the new unit would be for "employment on amphibious raids and diversionary attacks of limited duration."2 Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Mucci and using volunteers from Sixth Army units, the 6th Ranger Battalion grew to six rifle companies and a headquarters company. Ironically, it was the decimation of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Ranger Battalions at Cisterna, Italy that provided the TO&E personnel spaces to expand the 6th Rangers.3

Following a rigorous training program, the Rangers quickly achieved a high level of fitness and proficiency. They proved their mettle by seizing the islands guarding the harbor entrance during the landing at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines. Later, a reinforced C Company under LTC Mucci's direction joined two Alamo Scout Teams and a Filipino guerrilla force to rescue 513 prisoners held at Cabanatuan.

David W. Hogan, Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 83. 1

Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry, 83-84.

Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry, 85.

Adkins and Grimes teams performed an advanced reconnaissance. This proved unnecessary as the Japanese had evacuated the city.⁵¹

LTG Krueger and the Sixth Army were scheduled to establish their headquarters in the ancient Japanese capital city of Kyoto. A select group of Alamo Scouts accompanied Krueger as his Honor Guard when he arrived on 28 September. From this point forward, the Scouts were detailed to the 6th Ranger Battalion for administration but had no real duties. As time passed, the men gradually rotated back to the United States. The Alamo Scout Training Center, then located on Luzon at Subic Bay, closed on 10 October 1945. The Alamo Scout teams were never officially disbanded, but simply melted away with the drawdown of American forces.

The Alamo Scouts were established to meet the specific needs of Sixth Army. Their missions grew from straight-forward reconnaissance to increasingly sophisticated operations supporting the Philippine guerrillas and establishing intelligence networks. The product of a stringent selection process and an exceptional training program, the Alamo Scouts are part of the legacy of Army Special Operations Forces. In March 1988, they were awarded the Special Forces Tab in recognition of their role as one of the predecessors of Army Special Forces.

The author would like to thank Mr. Les Hughes for his contribution to the research of this article.

Kenneth Finlayson is the USASOC Deputy Command Historian. He earned his PhD from the University of Maine, and is a retired Army officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, special operations aviation, and World War II special operations units.

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U.S. troops landing at Wakayama, Japan, 25 September 1945. The Alamo Scout Adkins and Grimes Teams conducted advance reconnaissance of the landing beaches. Derr Team accompanied LTG Krueger from the Philippines and served as his personal security team when Krueger took control of the city.

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- 7 Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II, (Washington DC, Combat Forces Press, 1953) 10.
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- 13 The Japanese evacuated the island of Kiska undetected by the Allies in July 1943. Three weeks later, the Allies landed a major invasion force on the island. The enemy executed a similar evacuation from Guadalcanal. Kenneth Finlayson, "Operation Cottage: The First Special Service Force in the Kiska Campaign," Veritas, Vol 4, No. 2, 2008.
- 14 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, 29.
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- 25 First Lieutenant Thomas J. Rounsaville, Alamo Scouts, interview by Dr. Stanley Sandler, 1 October 1993, Fort Bragg, NC, transcript, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 Sumner Interview.
- 27 Smith interview.
- 28 Sumner interview.
- 29 Sumner interview.
- 30 Rounsaville interview.
- 31 Sergeant First Class Gilbert J. Cox, Alamo Scouts, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 14 December 2005, Des Moines, WA, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 32 Smith interview.
- 33 Zedric, Silent Warriors, 86-87.
- 34 Sumner interview.
- 35 Niles, "The Operations of the Alamo Scouts", 5.
- 36 Zedric, Silent Warriors, 276-279.
- 37 Cox interview.
- 38 Cox interview.
- 39 M. Hamlin Cannon, The U.S. Army in World War II, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines (Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), 21-39.
- 40 Cannon, 54-57. The 6th Ranger Battalion was another special operations unit created by LTG Krueger. The battalion was not affiliated with the Ranger battalions created by COL William O. Darby that fought in the European Theater. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci, the battalion commander, led C Company of the 6th Ranger Battalion, the main element in the Cabanatuan Prison Camp liberation in February 1945. Two Alamo Scout teams, Nellist and Rounsaville, acted as the advanced reconnaissance and guides on this operation.

- 41 Zedric, Silent Warriors, 276-279.
- 42 Sumner interview; Cannon, 329-346.
- 43 Sumner interview.
- 44 Sumner interview.
- 45 Smith interview.
- 46 Niles, , "The Operations of the Alamo Scouts", 20.
- 47 The Cabanatuan rescue mission is one of the most famous POW rescues in history. SGT Galen Kittleson of Nellist Team had the distinction of being on both the Oransbari and Cabanatuan rescue missions in World War II as well as the Son Tay POW rescue attempt in the Vietnam War. The Cabanatuan rescue is well documented. See Hampton Sides, Gliost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission, (New York; Doubleday, 2001); Zedric, 187-198; Forest Bryant Johnson, Hour of Redemption: The Heroic WW II Saga of Americas Most Daring POW Rescue (New Your: Warner Books, Inc. 1978); Charles W. Sasser, Raider (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002).
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